Introduction
The first of the international community's Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015 is that the proportion of people with an income of less than $1 a day shall be reduced to half what it was in 1990. From 1990 to 2001 the headcount ratio of poverty for all least developed countries fell from 27.9 to 21.1%, but in Africa it increased from 44.6 to 46.4% (Chen and Ravallion, 2004) .
1 It is not therefore surprising that several recent studies (for example, UNDP, 2003; Naschold, 2004) have argued that most African countries will fail to achieve the target. The change in poverty for a given rate of economic growth defines its elasticity with respect to growth, which depends on the level of the poverty line, per capita income or consumption expenditure, and its distribution among the population (Kakwani, 1993; Datt and Ravallion, 1992) . Although it varies with the level of economic development and income distribution (Bourguignon, 2002 (Bourguignon, , 2004 , for the sake of simplicity most studies have used a constant elasticity, an exception being Chen and Ravallion (1998) which demonstrates that the elasticity varies with regard to such initial conditions as the level of poverty and income inequality, and that countries with high initial poverty and inequality require higher rates of growth to meet the MDG. The present study examines these insights, to assess the challenge of achieving MDG1 in Africa. Specifically, it examines the validity of the widely accepted view that a very high growth rate of GDP (7% and above) is required for most countries in Africa, and whether the recent resurgence of growth in African economies might be a reason for some optimism. In addition, it considers how the effectiveness of distributional policies to achieve poverty reduction varies with initial conditions. It shows that the attainment of MDG1 is very much dependent on the income/inequality trade-off in each country, which, consistent with previous findings, varies with the initial level of both. Focusing on growth alone might not in general be the best way to halve poverty by 2015, since in some cases a slight decline in inequality might lead to a substantial decline in poverty. Thus it is necessary to study the growth-inequality-poverty nexus empirically.
The article finds that, on average, Africa needs only a relatively modest annual rate of growth in per capita household consumption to achieve MDG1 if inequality remains unchanged. Also, if current growth rates are maintained, nearly half of the countries in our sample can afford even some increase in inequality and still be able to reduce poverty by half by 2015. In the light of this, the study argues that the difficulty African economies have had in sustaining positive per capita income growth rates is a key problem when it comes to achieving MDG1.
The following section explains the analytical framework used, and Section 3 briefly describes the data sources, poverty lines and estimating equations. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 presents some of the challenges in meeting MDG1 in the African context, and Section 6 sums up.
Analytical framework
Since the announcement of the Millennium Development Goals by the OECD in the mid-1990s, a number of studies have used the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth to evaluate the growth required to halve poverty by 2015 (Demery and Walton, 1998; ECA, 1999; Naschold, 1999, 2000) .
Any poverty measure can be defined over per capita income and a measure of income inequality (Kakwani, 1993; Ravallion, 1992) , and there are a few different approaches available to estimate the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth. One is an econometric approach, where data on poverty, inequality, and per capita income are used to generate elasticity coefficients from a regression of the log of poverty on logs of per capita income and a measure of inequality, often the Gini coefficient. This approach is frequently used (for example, Ali and Thorbecke, 2000; Fosu, forthcoming) in crosscountry studies, where data on poverty and inequality are not available for more than one period in a given country. Another approach is simply to use the ratio of change in poverty to change in income over a given period as a measure (for example, Ravallion, 2001) . In the absence of data on poverty and growth spells, it is possible to decompose changes in a poverty measure into growth and inequality components based on the characteristics of the Lorenz function (for example, Kakwani, 1993; Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Bourguignon, 2002; Kraay, 2004) . The data requirement for this approach is minimal (one-period information on inequality is sufficient). In other words, it is possible to construct growth requirements to achieve MDG1 using Lorenz parameters under the assumption that growth remains distributional-neutral over the target period and work out the implications of changes in inequality on the requirement to meet the goal. This approach does not require assuming constant elasticity of poverty with respect to growth over the target period, which generally overstates the amount of growth required to meet MDG1. In addition, with an appropriate transformation of Lorenz functions, it is possible to establish a one-to-one relationship between the growth and reduction in inequality required to attain a target level of poverty. The following discussions on the possibility of achieving MDG1 in Africa are based mainly on the last-mentioned approach, since for most African countries the data available on inequality are limited to one period. But some results based on the other approach are also reported, both to gain further insights into the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth and to check the robustness of the values reported.
Following Kakwani (1993) and Datt (1998) , we use the Lorenz function as the basic building block for analysing the growth rate required to halve poverty 3 by 2015. It has the following properties:
where L is the share of the bottom p per cent of the population in aggregate consumption, π is a vector of parameters of the Lorenz curve estimable from a specific functional form that characterises income distribution, and P is a poverty measure obtained from the slope of the Lorenz curve at poverty line z and per capita income µ, and parameters of the Lorenz function. Two functional forms are frequently used to capture Lorenz curves: the General Quadratic Lorenz function (Villasenor and Arnold, 1989) and the Beta Lorenz function (Kakwani, 1980) for which there is widely available freeware (POVCAL) 4 to estimate the underlying parameters and poverty indices commonly used in the development literature (see also Datt, 1998 for further details). Once the parameters of the Lorenz function are estimated, it is possible to use established results to compute the amount of growth required to meet MDG1 without changes in income distribution, and alternatively the amount of reduction in inequality needed to achieve MDG1 without growth. To operationalise this, we use the wellknown result that the slope of the Lorenz curve at the poverty line z and per capita income µ 0 is:
which thus implies that:
3. We use the Foster et al. (1984) indices of poverty, which are suggested in the literature, to meet most of the desirable properties. See Hagenaars (1987) 
At half of P 0 , the Lorenz function would be:
Thus, to compute the per capita income level µ * consistent with poverty level 0.5*P 0 without a change in the Lorenz curve, one only needs to use equations (3) and (4) such that:
Since the left-hand side of equation (5) and the numerator on the right-hand side are known parameters, it is possible to compute the cumulative growth required to reach MDG1 by 2015 assuming that the Lorenz curve remains unchanged. Analogously, we can evaluate the amount of inequality reduction required to meet MDG1 if no growth at all occurs. Following Kakwani (1993) , we know that the slope of the Lorenz curve at which poverty is half its original level without a change in mean per capita income must satisfy the condition:
In addition, equation (6) can be rewritten as:
Using equations (6) and (7), we can solve for λ, which is the proportional change in the Gini index needed for a certain growth rate β. In fact, equations (6) and (7) can generate a set of per capita income and Gini values consistent with a headcount ratio at half the original poverty level, which may be seen as co-ordinates of an iso-poverty curve (for example, Bigsten and Shimeles, 2006; ECLAC et al., 2002) . For a given λ, it can be shown that the Gini coefficient of the new Lorenz curve is given by:
where G(Y) is the original Gini coefficient (observed from the data), which is defined over a vector Y representing the structure of income (ranked from the poorest to the richest), and Y* is a vector that represents the simulated income distribution consistent with the MDG target poverty level. The relations between β and λ then form the core of the growth-inequality nexus to meet MDG1. The set-up given in equations (6) and (7) allows for the consideration of several scenarios to achieve MDG1. Apart from the extremes, one can, for instance, work out the rate of change in the Gini coefficient required to meet MDG1 if the economy follows a historical growth trend up to 2015. Or alternatively, it is possible to compute the growth rate required to reach MDG1 in spite of a certain deterioration in income distribution. It should also be noted that the relationship between poverty, inequality and per capita income is not linear. It is not therefore admissible to hold the elasticity of poverty with respect to either income or the Gini coefficient constant. Following Datt (1998) , both elasticities vary with the parameters of the Lorenz curve and poverty levels. To show this, we may rewrite equation (1b) as follows:
where G( π ) is the Gini coefficient, which is a function of the parameters of the Lorenz function. Totally differentiating P with respect to µ and G and rearranging, we get:
we can rewrite equation (10a) as follows:
where ε is the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth and θ is the elasticity of poverty with respect to the Gini coefficient. We can also introduce the concept of isopoverty function (the rate of change in inequality required to keep poverty constant for a 1% change in per capita income) if we set the change in poverty equal to zero in equation (10b). (2) where ν proxies the 'growth-inequality' trade-off for small changes around the original poverty level. For the headcount ratio, ε and θ can be computed from the Lorenz function as follows (for example, Datt, 1998):
It is clear from equation (10) that the rate of change in the headcount ratio following a percentage change in per capita income and the Gini coefficient is a nonlinear function of the parameters of the Lorenz function and the level of poverty.
5 Thus, to make simulations on the relative roles of growth and distribution to meet MDG1, equations (6) and (7) are the most appropriate, since they implicitly address the variability of the elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income and inequality. This is our main approach. However, to examine the extent of the growth-inequality trade-off at the original poverty level, it is possible to use equation (10b), and we report some of the results for selected African countries in order to get some insight into the current role of income distribution.
Data and estimation methods
The paucity of data on poverty and income distribution has been a major constraint on empirical poverty analysis in Africa. Ideally, poverty data should come directly from household budget surveys, but in most cases only grouped distributional data are available, compelling the analyst to use per capita income or consumption data from sources in the national accounts. Certainly this may introduce a serious bias in the estimation of poverty as well as relevant elasticities. 6 Until complete data that are comparable over time and across countries are available, we shall not be able to get the full picture of the growth-inequality-poverty nexus in Africa.
In this study, we attempted to use nearly all the official data available on income distribution and per capita income to examine the nexus. We relied a great deal on distributional as well as per capita consumption data which the World Bank compiled for its 2004 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) . 7 These are constructed for a subset of 31 African countries primarily to get an aggregate picture of poverty by sub-region during the period 1981-2001, with substantial imputations for missing data. In most cases, the available distribution data and growth rates on per capita household final consumption were applied to obtain the parameters of the Lorenz function, slopes of which were used to generate the implied per capita consumption expenditure for some of the regressions reported in Appendix Table A1 . It appears that per capita 5. We may note that
6. See Ravallion (2002) for an elegant demonstration of the seriousness of the problem of combining data from household surveys and national accounts. 7. These data are available from the external website of the World Bank at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp household consumption expenditure from budget surveys was used where possible. So there is reason to believe that the poverty figures are comparable over time and to a certain extent across countries. We complemented the analysis using distributional data from WIDER, 8 and per capita household final consumption from national accounts. 9 The headcount ratio for $1/day/person is used to generate the coefficients of the iso-poverty functions specified in equations (6) and (7) to compare with results from the 2004 WDI data. In addition, these data were also used to compute the 'growth-equity' trade-off at the original poverty level to complement results based on equation (11). The relevant elasticities ε, θ (discussed in the previous section) were generated using POVCAL software. Table 1 reports two scenarios to attain MDG1 in Africa. One is a neutral-growth scenario where income distribution is held constant until 2015, and the other scenario shows the reduction in inequality needed to meet MDG1 if growth is stalled at zero. These two scenarios span the range of pro-poor growth patterns discussed in the recent literature (for example, Bigsten and Shimeles, 2006; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000; White and Anderson, 2000) . Intermediate cases also provide useful and realistic insights on the growth-inequality-poverty nexus. The results, based on 2004 WDI data, indicate that the average growth rate in per capita consumption required to meet MDG1 with a neutral pattern of growth is around 2.1%, while the median is slightly lower (1.9%), with notable variation across countries, from a high of 4.9% for the Central African Republic to a low of 0.7% for Morocco and South Africa. Considering a long-term average population growth rate of around 2.4% (World Bank, 2006) , the growth in consumption expenditure needed is about 4.5%. Alternatively, Table 2 , which is based on the WIDER distributional data set and per capita household final consumption expenditure from national accounts, provides a lower rate of per capita consumption growth required (1.7%), mainly due to differences in the per capita consumption expenditure used and the reference period. These estimates referred mainly to data from the early and mid-1990s, and thus ignored growth episodes in later periods. 10 We may note that both data sets generate some counter-intuitive poverty figures, such as those for Ghana using the WIDER data set, where extreme poverty plummeted within a span of a few years. However, in terms of summary statistics for the key variables, the two data sets provided comparable figures. In the WIDER data set countries such as Mali and Ethiopia would need a very high rate of per capita growth in consumption expenditure (4.8% and 4.2%, respectively) to achieve MDG1 without a change in inequality, while North African countries like Tunisia and Algeria needed a very low rate of growth (0.8%) to meet the MDG. Thus, in terms of the broad characterisation of African economies, the two data sets have 8. This data set can be downloaded from http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 9. Per capita household final consumption data were all in constant 2000 PPP and obtained from World Bank (2006). 10. Also, the sub-samples in both data sets are slightly different. much in common. The results from both clearly indicate that, by holding inequality at its current level, most African countries would be able to achieve MDG1 with relatively modest (but sustained) growth rates. If countries cannot achieve the required growth rates, then poverty reduction is in principle possible through reduction in inequality. However, it is more difficult to pursue redistribution policies in a stagnating or shrinking economy than in a growing one, so the feasibility of this route must be seriously considered. Nevertheless, it may be interesting anyway to see the order of magnitude in the reduction of inequality needed to reduce extreme poverty by half by 2015 in a stagnant economy. From Table 1 we can observe that Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, South Africa and Swaziland would need only a 5% decline in the Gini coefficient up to 2015 to cut poverty by half. Similarly, countries like Algeria, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa need the same small change in inequality to reduce poverty by half in the absence of growth, according to Table 2 . On average, a 14 percentage point decline in the Gini is needed to meet the MDG1 target without growth in Africa. Thus, since it is difficult to envisage the policy packages that would bring about this kind of dramatic decline in inequality without negative growth effects, growth still seems to be critical for attaining MDG1.
Discussion of results
So the redistribution scenario on its own may well not provide useful insights into the challenge of meeting the MDGs in Africa. If, however, we combine the ratio of growth required under a neutral-growth scenario with the inequality reduction needed without growth to meet MDG1, we have what might be considered the 'growthinequality' trade-off (or slope of the iso-poverty curve at the intercept).
11 This makes it possible to get a sense of what happens to the required growth if inequality rises in the run-up to 2015. Figure 1 illustrates this point for the 2004 WDI data set where countries such as Swaziland (8%), South Africa (6%), Tunisia (6%), Namibia (6%), Algeria (5%), Morocco (5%), Botswana (4%) and Lesotho (4%) need a very high rate of additional growth in per capita consumption to meet the MDGs if the Gini coefficient rises by only 1% up to 2015. Thus, rising inequality is indeed very costly for these countries. Conversely, the cost in terms of increased growth requirements of rising inequality is not so dramatic for countries such as Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda and Madagascar. For these countries the focus for a poverty reduction policy should be on growth. This seems to be the most efficient way of achieving MDG1, even if the growth there is combined with some increase in inequality.
We found the same feature based on elasticities of poverty with respect to both growth and inequality as depicted in equation (11), using the WIDER data set, by taking the ratio of elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita consumption and the Gini coefficient as a proxy for the slope of an iso-poverty curve at the original poverty level (see equation 10c). Appendix Table A1 reports the growth-inequality 'trade-off' for 21 African countries. It might be easier to reduce poverty (to move to a 'higher' isopoverty curve) through growth in some cases, and in others through reduction of inequality. There might be a range of desirable combinations of pro-growth and inequality-reduction policies, depending on the country and its circumstances.
11. The iso-poverty curve is non-linear by construction, depending largely on the initial poverty level and the curvature of the Lorenz function. An interesting scenario to consider is what would happen to MDG1 if recent growth performance (1999) (2000) were to remain unchanged until 2015. According to Figure 2 , about 8 countries out of a sub-sample of 31 experienced a negative per capita consumption growth in recent periods. Certainly, for these countries, completely unrealistic reductions in inequality would be needed to meet MDG1. On the other hand, more than half of the countries in the sub-sample have actually shown a per capita growth rate higher than that required under the neutral-growth scenario, suggesting the possibility that these countries can indeed afford even some rise in inequality up to 2015 and still reduce poverty by half. A few have a growth rate lower than that required under neutral growth, so that they require some reduction in inequality (at unchanged growth rates) to meet MDG1 in 2015.
The preceding paragraphs have summarised the key results following the simulations of the changes in growth and inequality needed to achieve MDG1 by 2015 in Africa. It would also be useful to reflect on the determinants of the required rates of growth and reduction in inequality. As shown in Section 2, the growth required to achieve MDG1 is a complex function of initial poverty, inequality, per capita consumption and the poverty line. So it is possible to find some anomalies in the growth-inequality-poverty nexus. As shown in Table 2 , there are some instances (Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Mauritania) where poverty declined in the face of economic contraction, and others (Lesotho) where it increased during economic expansion (see also Easterly, 2000) . In general, however, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4 , the growth required to achieve MDG1 rises with the initial inequality and falls with the initial income, confirming the findings reported in Chen and Ravallion (1998) . Differences in initial conditions provide some useful characterisations on the relative roles of growth and redistribution in meeting MDG1. Richer economies with high inequality can reduce poverty significantly through a slight decline in income inequality, while poorer countries generally need to focus on growth more than on redistribution. However, if such countries also exhibit high inequality, efforts to use growth policies while ignoring distributional concerns may not be politically feasible. Therefore, countries with low initial income and high income-inequality will be hard pressed to achieve the MDG1 target, since they face the double challenge of trying to achieve fast growth and to contain income inequality. 5 The sustainability of growth and persistence of poverty There is abundant empirical research trying to explain Africa's poor economic performance. A wide range of factors have been identified, from macroeconomic instability (caused by external or domestic shocks) to a set of initial conditions, such as geography (Sachs and Warner, 1997) , ethnic fractionalisation and conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) , 'bad' policies (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Easterly, 2000) , poor governance (Barro, 1997) , weak institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Rodrik et al., 2002) , and low human capital. Recently, Sachs et al. (2004) have argued that there are three types of poverty traps in Africa: the savings trap, the demographic trap, and the low capital-threshold trap. Thus African countries seem to suffer from many deepseated, structural problems that propagate poverty and make it hard to attain high growth rates and, once they are attained, to sustain them over extended periods of time (Collier and O'Connell, 2004) .
The fact that most countries in Africa need only a quite modest per capita income growth rate to attain MDG1 with inequality held constant, and that quite a few have registered growth rates over certain periods that would allow them to meet the MDGs even with some degree of increased inequality, makes it seem reasonable to focus attention on the sustainability of growth. A recent study on growth dynamics for developing countries (Berthelemy, 2006) reported that, of the 49 African countries covered, only five (Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Tunisia and Seychelles) registered multiple peaks (equilibrium points) at a growth rate in per capita income exceeding 3.5% over a period of fifty years. A few others (16) had only one such equilibrium after the initial per capita income, and most of the remaining ones only experienced growth cycles, with incomes essentially stagnating around the initial values. It is obvious that the nature of the growth dynamics in each country determines whether or not the required growth to meet MDG1 is feasible.
Since our data on poverty and inequality have been generated in most cases from very few time periods, it is not possible for us to distinguish whether these figures are consistent with a certain equilibrium per capita income. Nor can we say whether they are generated by shocks or, if so, how much of such shocks persists for a long time. Nevertheless, we attempted to use the cross-country data compiled for the 2004 WDI to examine if poverty rates for the sample countries exhibit some degree of persistence. As reported in Appendix Table A2 , the current growth rate of the headcount ratio is indeed affected by lagged values of poverty itself (true state dependence), and growth rates in lagged values of per capita consumption expenditure and the Gini coefficient. Our statistical test confirms that the instruments used to estimate the coefficients of lagged values are valid, and there are no serial correlation problems in our estimation. 12 This result is at least consistent with the notion that there is a persistence of poverty in Africa. Islam and Shimeles (2006) that, once pushed into poverty because of short-lived shocks, households in Ethiopia continue to experience poverty due to the fact of having been in poverty in the past. In other words, poverty propagates itself. Therefore, in order to sustain aggregate growth and reduce poverty, policies need not only to take care of the chronic component of poverty but also to protect households from shocks that push them into poverty.
Conclusion
This article has examined the challenge of halving poverty by 2015 in Africa using the available data on per capita consumption expenditure and its distribution. A distribution-neutral growth scenario was compared with different pro-poor growth scenarios, where reduction in inequality was considered as one possible means of achieving MDG1. The results suggest that, with a modest but sustained growth in per capita consumption expenditure and unchanged inequality, most countries in Africa can achieve the target. If recent growth rates in per capita consumption can be sustained until 2015, more than half of the countries in our sample, most of which are in subSaharan Africa, will attain MDG1. It was also shown that the growth-redistribution mix needed to reach the target depends on the initial poverty and inequality. Poorer countries, with relatively lower initial inequality, need to accelerate growth to achieve the MDGs, while countries with high initial inequality can go a long way with small changes in inequality.
The recent resurgence of African growth following the commodity boom suggests that per capita income growth may be even higher than what we have seen in the period analysed here. A key policy concern will then be the distributional consequences of this resource-based growth. Typically, the immediate distributional consequences of this type of growth have been less favourable for the poor, at the same time as African economies in general are unable or unwilling to pursue redistribution policies. Moreover, so far they have often failed to sustain growth over extended periods of time. The ability of countries to maintain stability and to deal with shocks and their persistence will be crucial for their chances of halving poverty by 2015.
Future research should include changes in the structure of the economy and the composition of household income to determine the sources of growth and inequality. Micro-simulations can be used to analyse how investments in physical and human capital, for example, contribute to growth and income inequality, and thus to poverty. In Africa, such analyses have so far been constrained in many countries by lack of household or individual data on living standards. Recent household-budget surveys, for example the Living Standard Measurement Surveys of the World Bank, provide a basis for a deeper analysis of the challenges of achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa. 
